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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this research is to establish a conceptual framework that contributes to explaining sustained 
competitive advantage, forming an analytical framework that brings the resource-based view and organizational 
analysis’ neoinstitutional approaches closer together. A detailed epistemological articulation has been undertaken 
to advance the understanding of strategy and competitive advantage in organizations, aggregating contribution to 
the  literature  with  the  proposal  of  a  theoretical model  that  steadily  articulates  elements  from  organizational 
institutionalism and the resource-based view. Hence, the major contribution is to associate the resource-based view 
and  organizational  analysis’  neoinstitutional  theory  as  a  means  to  reformulate  the  notion  of  institutional 
isomorphism, and have a potential new explanation for organizational diversity and the existence of organizations 
that are more capable of generating (or maximize) value than others. In its formulation, the similarity among 
organizations in their fields provides the baseline for organizational performance. Thus, it is from this baseline 
level  that  organizations  would then  be  able to  differentiate  themselves  and generate  sustainable  competitive 
advantage through active and selective response to different institutional pressures. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The  purpose  of  our  paper  is  to  present  the  foundations  of  organizational  analysis’ 
neoinstitutionalism (Nee, 2005), highlighting the concepts of legitimacy and isomorphism, as combined 
with elements of the resource-based view to support the idea of sustained organizational strategy. Based 
on Lippman and Rumelt (1982) and Barney (1991), an organization possesses a competitive advantage 
when it implements a value-creating strategy not implemented by current or potential competitors; 
additionally, an organization maintains a sustained competitive advantage when such competitive 
advantage continues to exist after efforts to duplicate that advantage have ceased. 
Economic theory argues that, in the absence of market imperfections, abnormal economic rents 
will be diluted as rivals and new entrants join the industry. Resource-based view, the dominant paradigm 
in strategic research, advances in the sense that organizations can obtain sustained abnormal returns if 
they own superior resources and are protected by mechanisms that prevent their diffusion throughout 
the industry. Hence, the concept of competitive advantage can be related directly to the notion of profits 
in excess of the opportunity cost of capital, and a persistently higher rate of return than competitors. An 
organization  holds  a  sustained  competitive  advantage  when  the  value  creating  strategy  is  not 
implemented by current or potential competitors and its benefits cannot be duplicated by others (Barney, 
1986, 1991; Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Penrose, 1959; Peteraf, 1993; Rumelt, 
1984; Wernerfelt, 1984).  
On the other hand, neoinstitutionalism aims to develop a sociological view of institutions. This 
theory describes the way they interact and how they affect society. It provides a manner for observing 
institutions outside traditional economic views by explaining why so many businesses end up having 
similar organizational structures in spite of evolving in different ways. Meyer and Rowan (1977) and 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) examine that organizations incorporate socially-rationalized procedures 
to  achieve  legitimacy,  regardless  of  the  effectiveness  of  those  practices.  Nonetheless,  while 
neoinstitutionalism  explains  organizations’  survival  through  continuous  adoption  of  legitimized 
structures, it has failed to specify how competitive advantage in the form of abnormal returns can be 
obtained by an organization.   
The association of the resource-based view and neoinstitutional theory is developed in this work 
as a means to establish the potential of a new explanation towards organizational diversity and the 
existence of organizations that are more capable of generating and maintaining (or maximizing) value 
than others. The similarities of organizations in the institutional field  only provide the baseline for 
organizational performance. Thus, it would be from this underlying level that organizations would be 
need to differentiate themselves and generate sustainable competitive advantage through active and 
selective response to different institutional pressures.  
There  are  several  explanations  for  organizational  heterogeneity  in  the  different  theoretical 
approaches on organizations (Table 1). All have their basis in the systemic movement. The design of 
organizations as open systems considers organizations and their external environments as parts of a 
larger system that interacts continuously. The organization exchanges resources with the environment, 
ensuring its survival, and changes to adapt to environmental contingencies that give access to these 
resources.  
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Table 1  
 
The Main Organizational Theories about Organizational Heterogeneity 
 
Theory  Main ideas  
Structural 
Contingency 
The organization exchanges resources with the environment, ensuring its survival, and 
changes through strategic decision making to adapt to environmental contingencies that 
give access to these resources (Burns & Stalker, 1961). 
Neoclassical  Neoclassical theory provides a new dimension to management, which engages with the 
internal  and  external  environments  through  strategic  planning;  i.e.,  the  process  of 
organizational alignment with the external environment from its analysis and development 
of strategies for action, adapting the organization to the environment (Caves & Porter, 
1977). 
Organizational 
Ecology 
Organizational ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) focuses explanation on the idea that 
the  diversity  of  organizational  forms  is  isomorphic  to  the  diversity  of  existing 
environmental niches. However, it adds to this idea the theory of competing populations; 
i.e., groups of companies with the same organizational form that compete for available 
resources in the niche. Because resources are finite and the competition is not restricted, 
the  population  best  adapted to  their  characteristics  survives  in  each niche. This idea 
became  known  as  competitive  isomorphism.  Inside  these  populations,  organizations 
compete for the available resources. 
Resource 
Dependency 
Resource dependent theory focuses on the view that managers seek to understand the 
organizational environment and make strategic decisions designed to control the resources 
that  companies  need  through  political  action  on  other  environmental  actors,  thus 
differentiating their organizations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Structural 
Dependency 
It is for the organization to optimize the choice of structure-delineating and situational 
factors  related,  respectively,  to  the  organization  itself  and  its  external  environment, 
seeking settings as congruent as possible. Thus, organizations in the same industry can 
have different structural configurations depending on their preferences and the choice of 
segment in which they act (Mintzberg, 2003).  
Resource and  
Capability Based 
Approaches 
Intra-industry heterogeneity due to creative resource-arrangement employment generates 
differences and opportunities in financial performance. Competitive advantage is kept 
through the maintenance of resources position barriers (Wernerfelt, 1984). 
This investigation follows a research tradition focused on the conversation of organizational 
institutionalism  with  other  economic  approaches  in  the  analysis  of  organizational  practices  and 
strategies (e.g., Beckert, 2010a; Conney, 2007; Delbridge & Edwards, 2013; Feldman & Pentland, 2003; 
Holmes, Miller, Hitt, & Salmador, 2013; Queiroz, Vasconcelos, & Goldszmidt, 2007). Beckert (2010a) 
offers a discussion of the interrelationships between  Economic Sociology’s networks (Granovetter, 
1985) and institutional and cognitive levels and their role in the change of market fields. Conney’s 
(2007) work, based on Giddens’ (1984) Structuration Theory and on the theoretical support of the New 
Institutional Economics (North, 1992), sought to analyze the process of institutionalization from an 
agency perspective. Delbridge and Edwards (2013) applied critical realism (Azevedo, 2002) to better 
understand  the  interdependencies  between  actions,  contexts  and  institutional  logics.  Feldman  and 
Pentland  (2003)  used  Giddens’  and  Bourdie’s  contributions  to  propose  a  reviewed  ontology  of 
Evolutionary  Economics’  organizational  routine  construct  (Nelson  &  Winter,  1982)  based  on  the 
interaction between its performative (concerning the agency) and ostensive (relating to institutional 
structure) dimensions. Holmes, Miller, Hitt and Salmador (2013) examined the effects of informal and 
formal institutions on countries’ inward foreign direct investment.  The  conclusions suggest that a 
country’s informal institutions shape its formal institutions, which in turn, affect foreign managers’ 
cognitive frames, which seek to invest in countries with institutional environments that allow their firms 
to  leverage  specific  advantages.  Seeking  to  assess  legitimacy  and  strategic  resource,  Queiroz, S. Popadiuk, E. R. Rivera, W. Bataglia  459 
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Vasconcelos and Goldszmidt (2007) observed that institutional entrepreneurship involves ambiguity and 
contradiction and, although it aims for differentiation, involves isomorphism.  
This investigation is able to aggregate relevant contribution through the purpose of a theoretical 
model  that  steadily  articulates  meaningful  elements  from  the  resource  based  view  and 
neoinstitutionalism for this understanding. Even though isomorphism is a fundamental concept in the 
construction  of  the  proposed  model,  its  focus  lies  on  explaining  the  heterogeneity  of  isomorphic 
pressures. Thus, we present the fundamentals of neoinstitutionalism, comprising concepts of legitimacy 
and isomorphism, to compose a perspective of the institutional environment complementing the original 
explanation of the resource-based view, to lay the foundations of sustainable organizational strategy.  
Along these lines, this work reassesses the idea of analyzing the organization as a passive actor 
driven by environmental changes, by identifying its sharing of the process. Two fundamental advances 
are proposed: (a) organizations that have the ability to define rationalized myths of their organizational 
fields  have  increased  competitive  advantage;  (b)  development  of  a  relevant  conversation  between 
neoinstitutionalism and resource-based theory, rather than just having the latter subsumed into the 
former, suggesting the prospect of raising the resource-based theory to the societal and organizational 
field levels. Therefore, this investigation revises and provides an alternative notion of institutional 
isomorphism as well as the exploration of the theme regarding organizational responses. Hence, this 
investigation is aligned with contemporary theoretical issues, given, particularly, the growing interest in 
exploring possible points of convergence among the institutional, cognitive and agency levels (Beckert, 
2010a, 2010b; Campbell, 2004; Streeck & Thellen, 2005). 
As these sociologic and economic approaches are conjugated, epistemological issues arise. The 
sociological basis of neoinstitutionalism embodies a duality of institutional structure and agency (Berger 
& Luckman, 1967). The first embodies the typification of habitual actions, values and rules sustained 
by a social group (institutional structure) while the second consists of its member’s actual actions at 
specific times, in specific places (agency). The resource based view goes beyond an analytical character 
and  does  not  abandon  the  agency  prescriptive  focus  on  the  economic  organizational  relationship, 
adopting formalistic and timeless elements. Concerning the delimitation of this theoretical research, the 
approach undertaken is centered on the agency and its relation with the institutional level, adopting a 
primarily analytical focus, as it explains why certain organizations are more successful than others when 
selecting an array of resources for competing in a market. 
 
 
Resource-based View Framework: The Idiosyncratic Employment of Resources 
 
 
Penrose (1959), Wernerfelt (1984), Barney (1986, 1991) and Peteraf (1993) are widely known in 
strategy literature. The resource-based view characterizes the  dominant paradigm  in  organizational 
strategy where resources are key performance-determinants. Important concepts from Penrose (1959) 
include organizational analysis as a collection of resources; the optimization in the growth path of a 
particular organization, combining internal and external resources; the process of organizational growth 
depends on characteristics concerning management as well as their experience and ability to learn. 
Penrose (1959)  examines that the services that a given set of resources provides will be  different 
depending on their idiosyncratic implementation. Thus, intra-industry heterogeneity due to creative 
resources employment generates differences and opportunities in financial performance.  
Barney (1986, 1991) defines resources as tangible and intangible assets that firms control and can 
use for strategy conception and implementation. According to Wernerfelt (1984) resources can be seen 
as a strength or weakness of a particular organization. Organizational resources are classified into three 
categories: physical capital resources, such as greenfields and equipment, geographic location, capital 
and  access  to  raw  materials;  human  capital  resources,  such  as  training,  experience,  judgmental 
capacity,  intelligence,  social  relationships  and  managers’  and  employees’  insights;  organizational 
capital resources, including infrastructure, capabilities, organizational processes, decision-making and Heterogeneity of Isomorphic Pressures   460 
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planning systems, control, coordination systems, company attributes, information, knowledge, in-house 
technology,  hiring  policies,  organizational  structure,  business  relations  (partnership,  government, 
community, distribution, customer, financial, industrial and supplier relations), reputation, leadership, 
prestige,  and  informal  relationships  among  groups  within  and  between  the  organization  and  its 
environment. 
Differently from the traditional neoclassical view, Wernerfelt (1984) examines the organization 
as a set of resources, where competitive advantage is generated through the maintenance of resource 
position barriers. Organizational resources are considered heterogeneous as in Penrose (1959), while 
barriers to resources are partially similar to entry barriers, since an entry barrier without a resource 
barrier places the organization in a vulnerable position to new entrants  while a resource barrier is 
valuable only when it translates into an entry barrier in at least one market.  
Based on Porter’s (1980) five forces, originally designed for product analysis, Wernertfelt (1984) 
assesses  that  for  resource  barriers  to  generate  profitable  opportunities,  there  must  be  no  supplier 
bargaining power – if a monopolistic group controls resources, returns will decrease to the users of 
that resource; no buyer bargaining power – once a given resource is sold in monopsony markets, the 
owner will earn lower profits; no threat of substitute resources – whose availability will reduce returns 
for the holder of a given resource; no  threat of  new entrants – discouraged through first mover 
advantage,  as  well  as  resource  barriers,  and  rivalry  among  existing  competitors  –  limited  by  the 
development of industry barriers to inimitable resources. Nevertheless, Barney (1991, p. 100) criticizes 
the “five forces model” approach as eliminating heterogeneity and immobility as sources of competitive 
advantage for two reasons: (a) the assumption that organizations within an industry are identical in terms 
of strategically-relevant resources controlled and strategies pursued; (b) the heterogeneity developed in 
an industry will be very short lived, as resources are considered highly mobile. 
An organization owns competitive advantage when current and potential competitors are unfit to 
simultaneously  establish  or duplicate the benefits of  this strategy. Not all organizational resources 
generate  sustainable  competitive  advantage.  To  induce  competitive  advantage,  a resource  must  be 
VRIN: valuable to explore opportunities and neutralize threats in the organizational environment; rare 
among  the  current  and  potential  competition;  inimitable  or  imperfectly  replicable;  and  non-
substitutable given the unavailability of a strategic substitute resource. A resource can be imperfectly 
replicable due to: capability to possess a resource because it is dependent on unique historical conditions 
(path dependency); ambiguous relationship of causality between resources and competitive advantage 
(causal ambiguity); employment of a resource that is socially complex, such as culture or reputation 
towards suppliers and customers (social complexity) (Barney, 1991).  
Heterogeneity may reflect the presence of superior productive factors available in limited supply. 
Factors can be fixed or, more frequently, quasi-fixed in the sense that their supply cannot be expanded 
quickly. They are scarce vis-à-vis the demand. Imperfect mobility concerns idiosyncratic resources 
with no use outside a given organization or, alternatively, tradable resources that present more value 
inside  than  outside  an  underlying  organization.  Ex-ante  limits  to  competition  means  economic 
performance depends on returns generated and the cost of implementing a strategy. Ex-post limits to 
competition address the preservation of diversity to keep sustainable competitive advantage over time, 
since strategists are primarily interested in long-term profits (Barney, 1986; Peteraf, 1993). Subsequent 
to the position to earn higher profits, there must be forces that limit competition for these profits, given 
that competition might dissipate gains through increased supply of scarce resources. 
High prices induce less efficient organizations to enter an industry as long as prices exceed 
marginal cost (MC). In equilibrium, demand and supply are equal, occurring the breakeven in high-cost 
organizations (P = MC), while low-cost organizations obtain extraordinary profits in the form of rents 
for their scarce resources (P > MC). A fundamental element is that superior resources remain limited in 
supply and, while most resources can be sold in imperfect markets of strategic factors, some assets need 
to be accumulated internally (i.e. relationships between a company and its suppliers and customers), 
based on the premise that marketable resources, due to inherent mobility, do not constitute sustained 
competitive  advantage  (Basso,  Meirelles,  &  Pace,  2005;  Dierickx  &  Cool,  1989;  Ginsberg,  1990; S. Popadiuk, E. R. Rivera, W. Bataglia  461 
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Peteraf, 1993). The resource-based assumption that strategic resources are created by consistent policies 
and accumulated internally implies the role of institutionalization towards organizational heterogeneity 
from intangible and non-tradable resources.  
 
 
Neoinstitutional Framework: Corporate Isomorphism and Legitimacy  
 
 
Similar  to  the  resource  based  view,  neoinstitutional  theory  also  adopts  an  open  system 
perspective, which means organizations undergo strong environmental influences. Hence, not only do 
forces based on competition and efficiency act upon the organization, but socially constructed beliefs 
and systems of rules also exert considerable control over organizations. Meyer and Rowan (1977), 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Scott (2001) are among its seminal authors. The neoinstitutionalism 
considers  myths  and  routines  and  conformity  confers  legitimacy  to  organizations.  Institutions  are 
conceived of as social constructions governed by rules, and institutional systems of interrelated formal 
and informal rules are construed as facilitating, motivating and governing economic behavior (Berger 
& Luckmann, 1967; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Nee, 2005; Scott, 2001).  
Modern organizational theory considers a world of diverse and different organizations and seeks 
to explain variations in organizational structures and behavior. Hence, it is of interest to investigate the 
reasons why considerable homogeneity exists among organizations, considering that, in the early stages 
of their life cycles, industries display considerable diversity in their organizations’ forms and practices. 
However, as the industry becomes well established, a trend exists toward homogenization. Meyer and 
Rowan  (1977)  analyze  that  organizations  incorporate  socially  rationalized  structures  (procedures, 
products, services, techniques, policies and programs) to achieve legitimacy, regardless of the efficacy 
and effectiveness of those practices. They function as power myths that are often ceremonially adopted. 
Legitimization derives from public policy and opinion, knowledge of education systems, social prestige, 
laws and definitions used in courts concerning negligence and prudence. Hence, elements of formal 
structure, embedded into bureaucracy, are manifestations of powerful institutional rules functioning as 
highly  rationalized  myths  that  influence  organizations.  The  origins  and  development  of  formal 
organization are based upon the following assumptions: (a) the extent to which institutional rules arise 
in certain areas of activity, formal organizations are created and expanded by incorporating these rules 
as  structural  elements;  (b)  the  more  modernized  the  society,  the  more  extensive  the  rationalized 
institutional  structure  in  underlying  areas  and  the  higher  the  number  of  areas  with  rationalized 
institutions.  
Scott and Meyer (1991) distinguish between technical and institutional environments. The first 
relates to efficiency and responses to market forces, while the institutional environment is focused on 
legitimacy  and  social  environment.  Addressing  the  impact  of  institutional  environments  on 
organizations, Meyer and Rowan (1977) assess three consequences: (a) the incorporation of external 
elements that are legitimate but not necessarily efficient; (b) the implementation of criteria for external 
or ceremonial assessment to set the value of structural elements (e.g. awards and external certifications); 
(c) how dependence on externally established institutions reduces turbulence and maintains stability 
(e.g. association and agreements relating to affiliation or state institutionalization, not to performance).  
Following these lines, DiMaggio and Powell (1991) define the institutional field as organizations 
that  constitute  a  recognized  area  of  institutional  life  at  the  aggregate  level,  including  suppliers, 
consumers, regulatory agencies and other organizations producing similar products or services. The 
contribution from this unit of analysis is the focus not only on competing organizations, but also on all 
relevant actors whose sources of power are not necessarily of an economic order. These authors observed 
that formal organizations, proposed by Meyer and Rowan (1977), are already established in modern 
society, and proposed that they continue to become more homogeneous as result of interaction processes, 
named isomorphisms, which occur in organizational fields and provide a context such that individual 
efforts to rationally deal with uncertainty and constraint lead to homogeneity in structure, culture and 
output.  Heterogeneity of Isomorphic Pressures   462 
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Organizations  not  only  compete  for  resources  and  customers,  but  also  for  political  power, 
institutional legitimacy, and social and economic adequacy. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1991), 
the  process  of  institutional  definition  is  composed  of  four  parts:  (a)  an  increase  in  the  degree  of 
interaction among organizations; (b) the emergence of precisely defined structures of domination and 
patterns of coalition; (c) an increase in the volume of information that organizations must address in the 
field; (d) development of a mutual awareness among participants in a group of organizations about their 
involvement in a common enterprise.  
The concept of isomorphism is a powerful tool for understanding the politics and ceremony 
affecting the functioning of organizations. Three mechanisms are observed through which institutional 
isomorphic change occurs: (a) coercive isomorphism - from laws, political influence and the problem 
of legitimacy (a regulative ingredient of institution); (b) mimetic isomorphism – in which organizations 
imitate  others,  resulting  in  standard  responses  to  uncertainty  (a  cultural-cognitive  ingredient);  (c) 
normative isomorphism - adoption of structures and patterns considered superior and associated with 
professionalization  (a  normative  ingredient).  Coercive  isomorphism  results  from  both  formal  and 
informal pressures exerted by organizations they are dependent upon as well as cultural expectations of 
the society in which the organization operates. These political influence pressures can be felt as force, 
persuasion,  or  even  as  invitations  to  collusion  schemes  (with  the  objective  of  evading  the  law) 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). 
Not all institutional isomorphism derives from coercive authority. Uncertainty is also a relevant 
force that encourages imitation. Hence, organizations may be modeled on other organizations when 
technologies are not well understood, goals are ambiguous or when the environment creates uncertainty. 
Models can be diffused unintentionally through resignation and transfer of employees, or explicitly by 
organizations,  such  as  consulting  organizations  or  trade  associations.  The  third  mechanism  of 
organizational  change  identified  in  DiMaggio  and  Powell  (1991),  normative  isomorphism,  comes 
primarily from pressures comprising formal education and a legitimation in a cognitive base, coming 
from academics as well as individuals who occupy distinguished positions in a range or organizations 
defining and promulgating rules and regulations about organizational and professional behavior. 
Scott  (2001)  deepens  the  understanding  of  isomorphisms  through  the  recovering  of  the 
philosophical and sociological bases of the institution construct. The author defines institutions as social 
structures having attained a high degree of resilience (resistance to shocks), including social norms, 
values, expectations, procedures, standards and routines. Three pillars are identified as constituents or 
supporting institutions: (a) regulatory pillar; (b) normative pillar; (c) cultural-cognitive pillar. The 
first pillar concerns the ability to establish rules, inspection of conformity and manipulation of sanctions 
(rewards and punishments) aiming to influence future behavior. These procedures can operate through 
informal mechanisms that may be diffuse or highly formalized to specialized players such as the police 
and courts.  
In the normative pillar, emphasis is on normative rules that introduce a prescriptive dimension, 
which is evaluative and obligatory in social life. Normative systems include both values and norms. 
Values are conceptions of what is preferred or desirable with the construction of standards to which 
existing structures or behavior can be compared and evaluated. Norms concern how things should be 
done and define legitimate means to achieve certain purposes of value.  
From the cultural-cognitive pillar, emphasis is on the following institutional elements: (a) the 
shared concepts that constitute the nature of social reality; (b) and the structures through which meaning 
is conceived. According to Scott (2001), in the cognitive paradigm what an individual does is largely a 
function of the internal representation of the world. Meanings arise from interaction, processed and 
maintained as they are used to assign significance to events. As the central Weberian premise, social 
action is considered to the extent the actor attaches meaning to the behavior, necessary not only for the 
profound understanding of objective conditions, but to their subjective interpretation as well. Along 
these  lines,  institutionalization  is  the  central  element  in  the  perpetuation  of  social  groups,  as 
institutionalization implies the dissemination of similar meanings. The more institutionalized a conduct, 
the more predictable and controlled it becomes. In most cases, the conduct is carried out voluntarily S. Popadiuk, E. R. Rivera, W. Bataglia  463 
BAR, Rio de Janeiro, v. 11, n. 4, art. 5, pp. 455-475, Oct./Dec. 2014                  www.anpad.org.br/bar   
through established institutional channels. Knowledge relative to society is a realization in the dual sense 
of  the  word,  aimed  to  understand  as  well  as  to  continuously  reproduce  the  social  reality. 
Institutionalization takes place when a reciprocal typification of habitual actions occurs by types of 
actors (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Hence, organizational structures (procedures, products, services, 
techniques, policies and programs) are institutionalized when they are believed to have some positive 
value for the organization, being so a causal strength for stable behavior patterns. It is worth noting that 
this definition of institutionalized structure leads to a contradiction in cultural terms with the definition 
of the institutionalized structure of Meyer and Rowan (1977), which is not related to effectiveness 
(Tolbert & Zucker, 1996), thus posing an unanswered riddle in the neoinstitutionalism approach. 
 
 
Proposed Model of Heterogeneity of Isomorphic Pressures and Sustained Competitive 
Advantage 
 
 
Scott and Meyer (1994) observe a transition from technical to institutional, which is the most 
common approach in neoinstitutionalism literature. The rationale is that initial adoption of procedures 
is commonly due to technical reasons, while further adoptions are ceremonial adoptions driven by 
institutional motives from the followers. Oliver (1991) distinguishes among strategic responses that 
organizations generate from institutional pressures towards conformity. A fundamental contribution is 
the development of a preliminary conceptual framework for predicting different strategies. The author 
notes that, while the resource based view stresses a range of active choice behaviors to manipulate 
external dependencies and the allocation of critical resources, the institutional approach has tended to 
limit predictions to procedural environmental conformity. The author observes the overly passive and 
confirming depiction of the institutional approach, and the potential for diversity in the degree of choice, 
awareness, reactiveness, influence, and self-interest organizations display under institutional pressures.  
In  later  work,  Oliver  (1997)  applies  institutional  insights  to  the  resource-based  approach, 
proposing  five  main  sources  of  organizational  homogeneity:  (a) regulatory  pressures;  (b)  strategic 
alliances; (c) human capital transfer; (d) social and professional relationships; (e) blueprints of expertise. 
These features regarding organizational homogeneity arise from integration in social and economic 
relations. Such relationships are related to government, business partners, employees recruited from 
competitors,  colleagues,  business  associations,  consultants,  and  other  sources  of  awareness  of 
competitors’ business practices.  
On the other hand, Lawrence (1999) develops concepts related to institutional strategy applied to 
the  description  of  organizational  action  patterns  toward the  management  of  institutional  structures 
within which organizations compete for resources (reproduction or transformation of structures). The 
idea is that, while the processes by which organizations adopt institutionally-legitimated forms and 
practices have been examined in previous literature, little attention had been aimed at organizational 
work of sponsoring new practices and transforming existing institutions. Two types of institutional 
strategies are identified: (a) membership strategies that involve the definition of membership rules and 
meaning posed to a community; (b) standardized strategies aimed at the establishment of technical, legal 
and market compliance defining normal processes throughout the supply of a particular good or service.  
Along these lines, Pache and Santos (2010) aimed to explain how organizations experience and 
respond to conflicting institutional demands. They advance on Oliver’s (1991) model, which does not 
explore  the  conditions  under  which  particular  resources  are  mobilized,  given  the  prediction  of 
organizational  resistance  to  multiple  conflicting  demands,  and  also  advance  on  the  rationale  of 
organizational  univocal  decisions  as  portrayed  in  Kim,  Shin,  Oh  and  Jeong  (2007).  Returning  to 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) and Meyer and Rowan (1977), a fundamental premise of Pache and Santos 
(2010) is that, in a fragmented field, organizations are responsive to multiple uncoordinated constituents, 
increasing the odds that institutional expectations will compete between the logics of effectiveness and 
legitimacy. Based on Scott and Meyer (1991), Pache and Santos (2010) assume conflicting institutional 
pressures as a subset of institutional pressures, whose organizational responses include: (a) acquiescence Heterogeneity of Isomorphic Pressures   464 
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(adoption  of  required  arrangements  by  external  institutional  constituents);  (b)  compromise  (partial 
conformity with all  institutional  expectations);  (c) avoidance (circumvent conditions);  (d)  defiance 
(explicit rejection of at least one institutional demand); (e) manipulation (attempt to change the content 
of institutional requirements). 
Recently, Ahmadjian and Yoshikawa (2013) observe a transition between two different types of 
institutional pressures, based on the recognition that even processes of organizational problem solving 
are subject to cognitive limits and political pressures (i.e. practice decoupling that do not fit technical 
needs; ceremonial or cursory adoption of practices). They observe that, when technical and institutional 
resolutions are taken into account, organizations solve internal problems and can also gain legitimacy 
from stakeholders, such as investors. 
Barnett (2004) reflects that industry-wide cooperation from trade associations may significantly 
improve organizations’ performance and survival rates, since strategies that trade associations employ 
to accomplish gains differ from the common concept of cooperation in the literature. Previous analysis 
had  focused  on  ways  organizations  can  increase  technical  capabilities  by  gaining  access  to  other 
organizations’ resources. However, trade associations differ in the sense that their objective is primarily 
to influence the external environment, rather than improve its members’ internal capabilities. Thus, trade 
associations are a form of institutional strategy which, based on Lawrence (1999), are patterns of action 
that  are  concerned  with  managing  institutional  structures  within  which  organizations  compete  for 
resources and trade association success is commonly determined by changes in external perceptions 
related  to  the  sector.  Barnett  (2004)  observed  that  trade  associations  allow  organizations  to  more 
efficiently and effectively reason with resource holders to convince them to favor their sector, by being 
able to present a coherent front in a unified position. Based on DiMaggio (1988), these efforts critically 
shape institutional opinion and can be particularly critical for crisis recovery.  
According  to  Lawrence  and  Suddaby  (2006)  and  Lawrence,  Suddaby  and  Leca  (2011)  on 
organizational  research,  even  though  traditional  emphasis  of  institutional  approaches  has  been  on 
explanation of organizational similarity based on institutional conditions, a new emphasis emerges 
towards the understanding of the role actors have in effecting, transforming and maintaining institutions 
and fields. The authors analyze that institutional entrepreneurs are pivotal to institutional processes, 
given  that  new  institutions  arise  when  organized  actors  with  sufficient  resources  identify  in  them 
opportunities to achieve highly valued objectives. However, the overall focus of institutional work has 
remained unarticulated. In their research, the authors adopt the premise of actors as rational in the 
context of being able to work with institutionally-defined logics of effect and adequacy and that, as such, 
culturally-defined forms of competence and knowledge are required, as well as creativity to adapt to 
demanding  and  dynamic  conditions.  It  is  suggested  that  the  examination  of  institutional  work  is 
concerned with sets of practices in which institutional actors engage to maintain institutions as well as 
those associated with the creation of new institutions and the disruption of existing ones.  
Along these lines, institutional structure is understood as both mutually constitutive of action and 
constituted by it (Giddens, 1984, 1986; Machado-da-Silva & Coser, 2006; Orlikowski, 2000). Even in 
highly constrained environments, actors self-monitor, interpreting their actions in order to create sense 
of what they are doing,  generating consciousness during the action, allowing the development of 
variations and the beginning of new institutionalizations processes, affecting the institutional structure. 
So institutional rules are not fixed or determined, but are rather a subject of ongoing formations and 
transformations by motivated actors.  
Battilana,  Leca  and  Boxenbaum  (2009)  state  that  institutional  change  is  a  complex  process 
involving different types of forces and agents and that research should not only address how institutions 
influence actors’ behavior, but also how these actors might influence and possibly transform institutions. 
Thus, the authors draw on the notion of institutional entrepreneurship as a new theme of research 
concerning endogenous explanations of institutional change. The authors identify the factors that enable 
the emergence of institutional entrepreneurship despite institutional pressures towards stability. Two 
categories of enabling conditions are identified: (a) field characteristics; (b) actors’ social positions. 
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actors perceive field conditions differently depending on their social position, whose point of view yields 
differential access to resources. However, organizational heterogeneity is assumed to exist a priori and 
is  considered  a  source  of  institutional  entrepreneurship.  Instead,  we  maintain  the  approach  that 
organizational heterogeneity is not a cause, but a consequence of institutional entrepreneurship as will 
be detailed below in the presentation of our proposed theoretical model.  
Beckert (2010a, 2010b) recognizes that Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1991) 
provide  a  one-sided  focus  that  leaves  out  insights  from  other  institutional  and  macro-sociological 
approaches and overlooks the role of divergent institutional development. Although the suggestion of 
divergent forces is not new, few attempts have been undertaken towards the integration of different 
theoretical premises of new sociological institutionalism. Drawing upon the typology proposed by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991), Beckert (2010a, 2010b) demonstrates that the mechanisms identified by 
them as sources of isomorphic change can also support processes of divergent change.  
Hence,  a  fundamental  contribution  from  Beckert  (2010a)  concerns  the  proposal  of  a  more 
integrated  perspective  on  institutional  development,  based  on  the  concept  that,  to  understand  the 
processes of institutional homogenization and heterogeneity, it is necessary to observe the mechanisms 
behind the processes through which institutional models prevalent in one social setting (i.e. nation or 
organizational field) might or might not emerge in another. Thus, contradictory theories concerning 
institutional change are not an issue of empirical failure but rather of theoretical deficiency.  
Gawer and Phillips (2013) examine forms of institutional work organizations undertake externally 
in the processes that conduct change in the institutional logic that characterizes their field, as well as 
how they respond internally to such shifts. Respectively, two forms of institutional work carried out 
externally and internally are identified: (a) external practice work and legitimacy work; (b) internal 
practice work and identification work. In this sense, the actions of vesting, defining and advocacy are 
political work through which actors reconstruct the rules, property rights and boundaries that determine 
access to material resources, whereas constructing identities, changing norms and constructing networks 
are actions in which actors’ belief systems are reconfigured. Finally, mimicry, theorizing and educating 
involve actions designed to change the abstract categorizations upon which meaning systems depend.  
The  ceremonial  adoption  has  its  basis  in  the  appropriation  by  organizations  of  institutional 
resources in the field, regardless of efficacy and effectiveness (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). We argue that when there is stability in the institutional field, organizations create and 
test variations of resources and capabilities based upon their idiosyncrasies, within the limits of the 
institutional  conformity,  aiming  to  differentiate  themselves  via  efficacy  and  effectiveness  in  the 
technical dimension. This process, amplified by learning, leads to novelties in the field. Only in an ideal 
condition, strictly theoretical, it would be possible to consider a hermetic system in which the isomorphic 
pressure  would  imply  perfectly  equality  between  organizations.  Simultaneously,  as  organizations 
become similar, the isomorphic pressure loses intensity, leading the system to its limit; meaning any 
additional demand can only be met by breaking the pattern, leading to pressure in the opposite direction, 
by differentiation. The exhaustion of the technical model by the emergence of technological, process, 
market or organizational-form innovations, originating in a company, an industry or even in a different 
industry, creates opportunity for review of the existing institutional framework in the field. 
We argue that the legitimacy obtained through ceremonial adoption enables the institutional work 
of  the  organizations  or  groups  of  organizations  that  find  new  solutions  based  on  idiosyncratic 
arrangements of resources for similar problems, and by the insertion of these  organizations in the 
dominant coalition (Selznick, 1949, 1957) and conduction of institutionalization processes (Tolbert & 
Zucker, 1996). These processes comprehend the participation in negotiations and decisions made in the 
sectorial associations and governmental organizations and/or development of deliberated strategies of 
dissemination of information. Along these lines, these organizations negotiate standards and rules to be 
followed  (coercive  isomorphism);  create  reputation  and  disseminate  information  that  lead  to  the 
adoption of the arrangements of resources of their interest by other companies in uncertain situations in 
order to reduce risks involved in decision-making (mimetic isomorphism) (Bataglia, Silva, & Klement, 
2011); and disseminate information to be taught in the education of professionals in the institutional Heterogeneity of Isomorphic Pressures   466 
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field,  for  example,  by  publishing  technical  manuals  by  standardization  organizations  like  ISO 
(International Standardization Organization) (normative isomorphism).  
There  is  thus  an  increase  in  isomorphic  pressure,  consequently,  reinitiating  a  new  cycle  of 
ceremonial adoption in the institutional field that differentiates organizations belonging to the dominant 
coalition  by  the  legitimation  of  the  resource  arrangement  of  their  interest,  associated  with  their 
effectiveness in the technical environment. Hence, we argue that this set of institutional work is highly 
related  to  obtaining  the  legitimacy  organizations  aspire  to.  Ultimately,  legitimate  organizations 
themselves define resources they should be allowed to acquire and employ in the institutional field. This 
process is verified in the study on the institutional and organizational genesis in the life sciences industry 
developed by Powell, Packalen and Whittington (2012) and is implicit in the field theory proposed by 
Fligstein and McAdam (2012). It could be the case that organizations that are part of trade associations 
and  multinationals  make  up  a  significant  amount  of  a  nation’s  gross  domestic  product.  These 
organizations are legitimate institutions by themselves and may heavily influence external environments 
rather than adopting externally imposed procedures.  
Our  argument  expands  the  neoinstitutional  theory  and  does  not  question  its  fundamentals. 
Ceremonial adoption remains central. The  existing theory is strengthened from the focus  “on how 
organizational actors are involved in cognitive processes of construction of reality” (Clegg, 1990, p. 83). 
Everyday relations between organizational actors in processes of competition, conflict, negotiation and 
exercise of power interfere in the definition and redefinition of the institutional structure and the existing 
isomorphisms  (Bourdieu  &  Wacquant,  1992;  Jepperson,  1991),  resulting  in  the  construction  of  a 
negotiated environment (Bataglia, Franklin, Caldeira, & Silva, 2009). Actors act in two ways, the first 
is the logic of compliance, targeting the best result given the current rules of the game, and in the second 
sense, trying to change the very rules of the game. The institutional structure is understood as mutually 
constitutive of action and constituted by it (Giddens, 1984, 1986; Machado-da-Silva & Coser, 2006; 
Orlikowski, 2000). 
It is worth noting that in the context of the application in organizations, the idiosyncrasy refers to 
peculiar characteristics of each organization with respect to its behavior. The behavior is inherent to its 
internal arrangement of resources aiming at managing its  processes, systems, structures, people, and 
strategies, as well as inherent to its external activities concerning relations with suppliers, shareholders, 
financial agents, Government, trade unions, community and their customers.  
These elements can be vectors that enable it to assume positions of leadership in situations that 
require changes in the status quo, in local terms (associations, trade unions, for example) or national 
and/or international terms when substantial changes are needed in the rules of the market game. These 
changes happens in the face of possible threats arising from modifications of regulatory legislation, 
insertion or modification of technologies, social movements, entry of new competitors or the insertion 
of  product  substitutes.  Efficiently  and  effectively  using  this  set  of  vectors  that,  in  essence,  are 
organizational assets, can result in a resource heterogeneity factor. With this heterogeneity, a particular 
organization can generate a competitive advantage from the point of view of its internal use, as well as 
its use in the external context, when it will be able to avail themselves of this differentiation of resources 
due to its idiosyncratic character in situations of potential threats to its market position. 
Organizational  idiosyncrasy  is  based  on  the  history  of  the  organization,  its  culture,  values, 
reputation,  brand,  market  power,  lobbies  (technological,  commercial  and  political),  size,  skills, 
knowledge, allowing to the organization a differentiated positioning for problem solving in its field that 
could lead to an above-average level of profitability. Nonetheless, in a situation where part of this 
arrangement of resources is not considered an organizational strength, the organization could be in a 
situation  of  competitive  parity  or  even  competitive  disadvantage.  Thus,  in  the  first  situation,  the 
organization is able to assume a leadership position and, therefore, be the main driver of changes in the 
existing institutional model. The second situation, in competitive parity, even though the organization 
may have some influence in decision-making relating to the existing institutional model, its strength in 
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Organizations that already are at a competitive disadvantage likely will be mere co-adjuncts of 
the decision-making process and in eventual changes to the existing institutional scenery. The first 
aforementioned organizations can participate with more intensity in the decisions that may alter the 
existing institutional scenery elements, in order to obtain advantages associated with changes. Although 
this intense participation, probably, should bring some loss to the other two types of companies, it is not 
always possible to predict that any advantages be a marked playing card. There are always risks 
involved, technological and geographical issues, for example. 
The theory proposed is that, although organizations undergo pressures for aligning with their 
respective  institutional  environment,  the  manner  in  which  organizations  react  and  transform  such 
pressures into favorable institutional environments – at first by complying ceremonially and, ultimately, 
by influencing and taking strategically institutionalization procedures for new idiosyncratic arranges of 
resources  –  properly  integrates  the  resource-based  and  neoinstitutional  frameworks  into  the 
organizational strategic field. Given the relevance of institutions in determining success or failure of 
specific strategies, it is essential to any organizational strategy to consider ways to influence the creation 
and maintenance of favorable institutions through institutional work.  
Even though other authors have recognized the role of institutions for maintenance of strategic 
positions (Busanelo & Vieira, 2007; Ingram & Silverman, 2002; Queiroz, Vasconcelos, & Goldszmidt, 
2007; Silva, 2007; Song & Cho, 1997; Tolbert & Zucker, 1999), the means by which institutional 
resources could be obtained and employed for sustainable competitive advantage remained unclear 
through the available theoretical resource-based view and neoinstitutional theoretical framework. The 
model proposed expresses that, while some companies incorporate the demands of the institutional 
environment  more  effectively  than  others,  organizations  maintain  and  expand  their  competitive 
advantage when responses to institutional pressures are not reproduced as quickly or as effectively by 
other  organizations.  Since  the  institutional  isomorphism  promotes  the  survival  and  success  of  the 
organization, we consider it as a necessary process for maintaining a competitive advantage, causing a 
chain reaction of organizations wishing to maintain their competitiveness in their organizational field.  
Institutionalized practices become VRIN due to the organization’s ability to exploit resources at 
a wider level, as well as because of path dependency and their social complexity. Based on Meyer and 
Rowan (1977), organizations that incorporate socially-legitimized rationalized elements in their formal 
structures maximize their legitimacy and increase their capabilities as well as resources for survival. 
Hence, organizations incorporate institutional elements in a manner that is not necessarily uniform. To 
acquire  and  maintain  sustained  competitive  advantage,  the  possession  of  resources  and  their 
idiosyncratic development is required, allowing organizations to achieve different strategic orientations 
with the same set of resources. The proposed model is illustrated in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. Model of Organizational Response to Isomorphic Pressures. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
Adopting a perspective in organizational strategy integrating both the economic framework of the 
resource-based  view  and  the  neoinstitutional  sociological  approach,  determinants  of  sustained 
competitive advantage includes compliance, effectiveness, influence and legitimacy. Compliance is the 
organizational adequacy to the institutional environment, incorporating socially rationalized procedures 
(myths)  to  obtain  legitimacy  such  as  services,  techniques,  policies  and  programs.  Although  the 
incorporation of rationalized elements does not necessarily imply efficiency, the organization should 
maximize their payoffs in relation to its competitors, transforming parameters of change into relative 
operational effectiveness, promoting the incorporation of  myths that function  to the benefit of the 
organization, differing from organizations that simply ceremonially adopt procedures. Ceremonialism 
implies conformity, characterized in this investigation as the first stage for organizational heterogeneity. 
Aligned with Oliver (1991), we observe the theoretical potential of aligning the survival value of 
conformity  with  the  adaptation  to  environmental  uncertainty  by  actively  managing  or  controlling 
resource flows, comprising manipulation of external dependencies and influence over the allocation of 
critical resources through the creation of variations of idiosyncratic arrangement of resources in order 
to  get  efficacy  and  effectiveness  in  the  technical  dimension,  while  maintaining  compliance  with 
institutional demands. Through socially complex resources, such as culture and reputation with suppliers 
and customers, as well as formal and informal relationships with other organizations, associations and 
other political bodies, influence through institutional work is an essential proactive tool for institutional 
changes and consequent power for favorable re-configuration of the institutional matrix, incorporating 
new  arrangements  of  resources  of  interest.  Characterized  as  a  component  that  increases  resource 
capacity and organizational survival, legitimacy is not itself a VRIN resource, but it follows influence, 
which means that the organization has a genuine ability to not only receive external pressures, but also 
to create myths, allowing greater flexibility of operation and establishment of ex-ante and ex-post limits 
to competition. The organization uses its institutional resources to differentiate itself and promote the 
mobilization of stakeholders for strategic processes. Complementing Pache and Santos (2010), we argue 
that these parameters increase the possibility for an organization to cope with seemingly conflicting 
demands.  
As described by the resource-based view, institutions as non-tradable resources are applied in the 
resource  framework,  and  are  characterized  as  bodies  of  knowledge  subsequently  legitimized  by 
typification of specific actors’ actions. We observe that institutions are a superior resource in limited 
supply and, considering the apparent homogeneity of intra-organizational efficiency, an organization is 
led to abnormal returns due to its institutional heterogeneity. Applying to concepts  in  Berger and 
Luckmann (1967), legitimacy is not necessary in the first stage of institutionalization, since institution 
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is simply a fact that does not require any new support, intersubjectively or biographically. The problem 
arises when the objectifications of institutional order need to be transmitted to a new generation. Thus, 
having broken down the unity of history and biography in order to restore it intelligently, explanations 
of and justifications for the salient elements in institutional tradition become necessary. Otherwise, 
competitive advantage becomes temporary and dissipates at the influence-level for not concreting itself 
into legitimacy. 
Thus,  legitimacy  is  the  process  of  explanation  and  justification  for  the  perpetuation  of 
institutionalization. Legitimacy not only tells the individual they must perform an action in lieu of 
another, but also the motives for why things are done a certain way. In other words, knowledge – which, 
in  reality,  are  the  very  institutions  –  precedes  the  values  in  the  institutional  legitimacy  and, 
institutionalized, provides organizations competitive advantage. Prior to the proposed integrative model, 
a theoretical dissociation had been verified between institutions and resource capital. The fundamental 
implication is that the ability of organizations to generate rents from resources depends primarily on the 
organization’s effectiveness in managing these resources’ and capabilities’ social context. Previous 
works in the strategic field generally maintained that institutional pressures were direct sources of 
organizational  homogeneity,  paradoxically  assuming  that  relations  of  influence  (e.g.  government, 
business  partners,  employers  recruited  from  competitors)  could  reduce  homogeneity  through  the 
learning of business practices adopted by the competition.  
Using the assumptions from the resource-based approach that lasting differences of profitability 
cannot  be  attributed  only  to  industry  differences  and,  even  though  most  resources  can  be  sold  in 
imperfect markets of strategic factors, some non-tradable and immobile assets accumulated internally 
and  related  to  the  organization  can  be  sources  of  competitive  advantage.  Thus,  this  paper  places 
institutional resources in the same framework as capital resources for organizational heterogeneity, as 
VRIN (valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, non-replaceable), non-tradable, immobile or imperfectly 
immobile resources.  
 
 
Implications and Concluding Remarks 
 
 
From  the  analysis  of  seminal  authors  and  theoretical  extensions,  we  have  incorporated 
institutional  resources  and  the  environment  through  the  resource-based  view  framework  and 
neoinstitutionalism in organizational analysis.  
An apparent theoretical contribution of this work to the neoinstitucional theory is that it proposes 
a solution to the riddle of the “contradiction in cultural understanding (i.e. structures mean commitment 
to action; and that structures may not be related to action)” (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996, p. 180). In the 
theory proposed, ceremonial adoption is understood as effective and necessary by the organizational 
actors for their participation in the dominant coalition, making the institutional work that defines and 
redefines the institutional matrix feasible, allowing them to legitimize the arrangement of resources 
linked to the their effectiveness, differentiating them, creating heterogeneity. Therefore, ceremonially 
adopted  institutional  structures  are  a  result  of  agents’  actions.  Thus,  there  would  be  no  unlinked 
institutional structures of action per the criticism formulated (but not yet solved) by Giddens (1979), 
Geertz (1973), Goffman (1959), Granovetter (1985), Oliver (1991), Barley and Tolbert (1988) and 
Tolbert and Zucker (1996), among others. 
Another apparent contribution is the focus shift from the macro dynamics of the institutional field 
to the relationship between the institutional structure and organizational actors’ cognitive and agency 
processes via strategic decisions and political actions (Beckert, 2010a, 2010b; Campbell, 2004; Streeck 
& Thellen, 2005). 
Regarding  the  contribution  to  organization  management,  it  is  worth  highlighting  that  for 
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the idiosyncratic application of institutional resources in response to isomorphic pressures comprise both 
the technical and institutional environments. Institutional resources are considered as VRIN and can be 
applied to the influence of key stakeholders such as partners and strategic competitors, governments, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in support of organizational business strategy. This means 
negotiation of conflicts with major customers and suppliers, completion of acquisitions and alliances, 
as well as the assurance of funding from investors and banks. The conversation between the institutional 
and resource-based approaches suggests the elevation of the resource-based theory to the societal and 
organizational field level, rather than subsuming the latter into the first. 
From the integrative model developed, managers take institutional pressures and opportunities to 
establish sustainable competitive advantage. This is only the first stage of response to  institutional 
pressures, which is the compliance of minimum requirements to participate in the institutional game. 
The institutional isomorphism promotes the survival and success of the organization and consists of a 
necessary process for the maintenance of competitive advantage, causing a chain reaction often initiated 
by a leader organization(s) in an industry. This study highlights that managers need to be aware that the 
translation  of  institutional  environmental  pressures  into  greater  organizational  effectiveness, 
environmental impact and, ultimately, legitimacy of their actions will depend on the organization itself.  
While some companies incorporate demands from the institutional environment more effectively 
than others – not just by possession, but by mobilization of strategic resources – organizations maintain 
or even expand their competitive advantage when their responses to institutional pressures are not 
reproduced  as  quickly  or  effectively  by  other  organizations  (idiosyncratic  deployment).  Among 
theoretical  developments  in  organizational  strategy,  it  appears  that  the  institutional  isomorphism 
provides opportunities for organizational heterogeneity, since the ceremonial adoption of procedures 
does not automatically translate into compliance, effectiveness, influence and legitimacy towards the 
strategy of maintenance and expansion of organizational competitiveness.  
In addition, it should be noted that organizations must mobilize institutional resources such as 
knowledge, social-cognitive skills, and typifications of actions to achieve objectives of differentiation 
and competitive advantage. Legitimacy is not necessary in the first stage of institutionalization in which 
an institution is simply a fact that does not require any new support. However, for knowledge and actions 
to be intelligently assimilated by stakeholders, explanations of the salient  elements of institutional 
tradition become necessary. As such typifications are justified, the  legitimacy phenomenon occurs, 
which explains the institutional order granting validity to their cognitive and normative meanings, 
which is not solely a matter of values, but knowledge in its objective sense.  
Thus, the institution remains at the organization for long-term use and is a source of competitive 
advantage. Institutions have characteristics of heterogeneity, limited imitation, and imperfect mobility. 
Thus, legitimacy is not a feature under the resource-based framework, but occurs from the justification 
of typified actions and values that shape institutions, which, in turn, are the result of idiosyncratic 
deployment  of  institutional  resources  that  can  be  used  as  VRIN  resources  for  the  influence  of 
stakeholders.  Institutionalization  is  considered  a  reciprocal  typification  of  actions,  including  the 
development of coalitions to influence legislators, working with institutional shareholders and also the 
influence of opinion formers in the media and analyst communities. Through negotiation, development 
of coalitions and public relations, business environments can be positively shaped, contributing to the 
heterogeneity of organizations and sustainable competitive advantage. 
Research questions that emerge from the integrative model include the systematic assessment of 
institutional organizational resources, the understanding of the ways to achieve greater diversity from 
institutional pressures as well as practical ways to employ institutional resources to achieve greater 
organizational heterogeneity and sustained competitive advantage. Prior to the development of this 
integrative model, just through Oliver’s (1997) classic integrative work, it was not possible to explain 
institutional  resources  in  the  theoretical  framework  of  capital  resources;  questions  about  the 
management of institutional  resources for generation of rent; ways to mobilize institutional resources 
in order to establish competitive advantage, which were previously considered sources of organizational 
heterogeneity  mitigation  and  differences  in  rents.  Thus,  in  our  proposed  integrative  model,  the S. Popadiuk, E. R. Rivera, W. Bataglia  471 
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incorporation of institutions as resources in a more specific and systematic manner in the theoretical 
framework of the resource-based approach is an important theoretical and practical contribution.  
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